This paper reconsiders strategic trade policy when a high-cost and a l o w-cost rm belonging to di erent countries compete a la Cournot in a third country market and technology is transferable. Assuming technology is transfered via licensing, optimal export policy is characterized. Apart from a ecting product-market pro ts -which i s standard in this literature, any subsidy or tax, also a ects the licensing decision and surplus generated from licensing in our framework. Interestingly enough, an increase in subsidy by the high-cost country's government raises the surplus while the surplus is lowered by a n increase in subsidy by the low-cost country's government.
Introduction
There has been a great deal of research regarding strategic trade policy over the last two decades. A central result in this literature 1 is that export subsidy is optimal when two rms of di erent countries engage in Cournot competition in a third country market. Subsequent w ork 2 has shown that the sign and magnitude of policy crucially depends on factors like nature of oligopolistic competition Cournot vs.Bertrand, number of rms relative n umber of foreign and home rms and ownership of rms.
These models share a common framework -rms either compete in quantities or prices and prior to this product-market competition, governments credibly commit to subsidy rates. However, these models abstract from the possibility of technology transfer prior to product market competition. This paper considers trade policy in an environment where technology transfer is feasible. We assume that technology is transferred via licensing and that the license fee cannot be taxed directly 3 . A major di erence of this paper from the standard literature is that any subsidy or tax, in addition to shifting pro ts also a ects transactions regarding technology transfer.
We consider a high-cost and a low-cost rm belonging to di erent countries in the third-country model of strategic trade policy literature and reexamine rent-seeking incentives for government i n tervention in the presence of technology transfer. The central result of this paper is that often the subsidy levels are lower when technology transfer is feasible compared to when technology transfer is infeasible. In fact, for a range of cost parameters the optimal policy for the government of the high-cost rm might be to tax its own rm.
In our framework, in addition to its e ect on pro ts, there are two additional e ects of a subsidy -e ect on surplus of licensingwhich the two rms share and the e ect on the subsidy bill. With reasonable restrictions on pro t function, an additional unit of subsidy by the high-cost country's government raises the surplus while an additional unit of subsidy by the low-cost country's government l o w ers it. Hence, from the surplus perspective, the high cost country's government w ants to increase the subsidy while the low-cost country's government w ants to lower it. However the incentives are reversed when we consider the e ect on the subsidy bill. For any 1 Brander and Spencer1985 2 See Eaton and Grossman1986 3 A similar assumption has been made for example in Brander and Spencer1987. given subsidy rate, the subsidy bill for the high-cost country following technology licensing is higher compared to the case when licensing is infeasible and hence the high-cost country's government w ants to lower subsidy. O n the other hand,the subsidy bill is lower following licensing for the low-cost country for any subsidy rate. The di erences in the e ects on the subsidy bill between two countries is due to the fact that the output produced by the high-costlow-cost rm is largersmaller following technology transfer. Since the`surplus e ect' and the`subsidy-bill e ect' work in opposite directions for each country, the net e ect seems to be ambiguous in general and depends on the way the surplus is shared. We nd that unless the high-cost rm earns a large share of the surplus, the optimal subsidy in our framework should be lower than the Brander-Spencer subsidy -the optimal subsidy when licensing is not feasible. In particular, if the surplus is split equally the optimal subsidy is lower than the Brander-Spencer subsidy.
It is worth mentioning that the optimal subsidy for the high-cost country is not only lower compared to the Brander-Spencer subsidy rate but for a wide range of values of surplus-sharing parameter 4 optimal policy is a tax. With licensing, a tax brings more revenue to the high-cost country's government because of the higher output produced by its national rm. This incentive t o tax outweighs the incentive to subsidize when the bene cial e ects of subsidy are small -i.e. when the high-cost rm earns a low share of the surplus. Thus, licensing apart from strategic complementarity or joint pro t maximization, provides a rationale for taxation in strategic trade policy models.
Unlike the existing results in the literature on strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs 5 , w e nd that generally there exists a non-monotone relationship between cost-di erences and the subsidy level. In the absence of licensing, Neary1994 has shown in the context of linear demand and constant marginal cost that optimal subsidy of a government increases with the cost-competitiveness of the national rms -that is, a government subsidizes winners" more generously. The intuition for this is simple. Consider the rm with lower marginal cost. The larger the di erence in costs, the higher the comparative advantage of this rm in pro t-shifting and hence the higher the subsidy it receives. In our framework however, there are two sources of rents -surplus from licensing and pro ts -which respond di erently to an increase in the subsidy rate. An increase in the subsidy rate by the low-cost country's government l o w ers the surplus and the magnitude of the`surplus e ect' is increasing in cost-di erence. This suggests why the low-cost rm might actually receive a l o w er subsidy the more e cient it is. The nonmonotonicity is borne out most strikingly in the optimal subsidy schedule of the high-cost rm where we nd that the e cient high-cost rm might b e taxed and the relatively ine cient high-cost rms might be subsidized.
The main discussion in the paper focuses on the rent-shifting motive i n Cournot-competition in the presence of licensing. However the e ects are qualitatively similar in the case of Bertrand competition with di erentiated products. One important di erence between Cournot and Bertrand competition with di erentiated products is that the high-cost country's government might w ant to ban licensing under Cournot competition while it will never do so under Bertrand-competititon with the reverse being true for the low-cost country's government.
The issue of trade policy in the presence of technology licensing is particularly important in the wake of the recent trend for globalization. Trade is no longer equivalent to imports or exports of merchandise. Mergers and acquisitions M&A's and technology transfer are major components of cross-border collaborations. The growing number 6 of technology transfers in general and trans-national transfers in particular, is clear from the following excerpt from Nadiri 7 1991
In the past few years the pace of technology transfers has been increasing rapidly, particularly among the OECD countries. Statistics on international payments for patents, licenses and technical know-how among the OECD countries have been growing substantially.......... For Japan and U.K. the total transaction between 1970 to 1988 increased by about 400, France and the U.S. experienced an increase of about 550 while West Germany had a spectacular increase of over 1000 between 1979 and 1988." Apart from the obvious connection with the strategic trade policy literature, this paper is also related to the literature on technology transfer. The technology transfer literature 8 has generally focussed on technology transfer between rms of the same country. In contrast to this paper, license fee is not important for welfare considerations in such cases. Though there has been welfare analysis for di erent mechanisms to license technology, there is hardly any analysis of Pigouvian policies in the context of licensing -especially when the licensee and the licensor belong to two di erent countries. Thus our paper also extends the licensing literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays down the framework of our model. Section 3 discusses the relationship between licensing and the subsidy rates. Section 4 characterizes the unilaterally optimal policies both for the high-cost and the low-cost country and compares it with the BranderSpencer subsidy. Section 5 considers simultaneous policy-making by both governments. Section 6 examines the robustness of the results obtained in Cournot-framework in price competition with di erentiated products. Section 7 concludes suggesting further extensions. Proofs of the Lemmas and the Proposition are in the Appendix.
Model

Environment
We consider a Cournot duopoly with a homogeneous product where the two rms belonging to di erent countries compete in a third country market 9 .
Technology: Production technology of a rm is a pair -c; K 2 2 where c 0 denotes the constant marginal cost of production and K 0 denotes the xed cost. Fixed costs are assumed to be appropriately large.
Marginal cost c 2 f c l ; c h gwhere c h c l 0. Initial technologies of the two rms are assumed to be di erent. The rm, starting o with c h c l will be referred to as high-costlow-cost rm and the country that the rm belongs to will be referred to as the high costlow-costcountry. W e also assume that c h p m c l where p m c l refers to the monopoly price with low-cost rm as the sole producer.
Technology is transferable -i.e. the low-cost rm rm l hereafter can transfer its low-cost technology to the high cost rm rm h hereafter 10 . The mode of technology transfer is licensing. Low-cost rm licenses the technology to its high-cost rival for a fee. Details of the licensing mechanism are described in the next subsection2.2.
Demand: We assume that the inverse demand 11 for the homogeneous product in the third country market is given by p = a , x h , x l 1 where x h and x l refers to the output produced by rms h and l respectively.
The Game
Sequence of Events: The timing of events is given by the following threestage game. In the third and nal stage of the game, the two rms engage in Cournot-Nash competition in the product market of the third country. Prior to product market competition, in the second stage of the game, the rms decide whether to undertake technology transfer or not and the license fee associated with technology transfer. In the rst stage, governments simultaneously decide on subsidy rates they would o er to their national rms. The details of the game are described below. Equations2 and 3 describe the pro t maximization problems of rm h and rm l respectively. The m i 's can be interpreted as the e ective marginal cost of production of a rm. Though the rms start with c i 's, the marginal costs that enter into a rm's pro t-maximization problem in the third stage take i n to account also the subsidy and constant-cost technology it actually uses which is di erent from the initial one for rm h if there is licensing and is captured by m i .
Licensing Stage 2 : Prior to the product market competition rm l can license its low-cost technology to h for a xed 12 feeF. Notice that licensing takes place only if joint pro ts in the presence of licensing is higher than joint pro ts in the absence of licensing. We use the term joint pro ts to denote the sum of pro ts of the two rms resulting from the non-cooperative Cournot-duopoly in Stage 3. We denote joint pro ts by = h + l .
Surplus from technology licensingif any is D = L , NL where L and NL denotes joint pro ts with licensing and no licensing respectively. Let denote the share of surplusD accruing to the licensee 13 . The relation between F;D and is captured in the following equation:
Rearranging 4 we could express the license fee as:
Notice that = 0 implies a take-it-or-leave-it o er to by the rm l while = 1 implies take-it-or-leave-it o er by the rm h. RentsR of rm h and rm l are R h = h + F dand R l = l , F drespectively where 12 Allowing for royalties along with a xed fee leads to the possibility of collusion -A suitable non-linear pricing scheme can be devised such that only one of them produces and the rms split up the monopoly pro t. As Katz and Shapiro1985 has pointed out that this kind of behavior is likely to violate anti-trust laws and hence we rule out use of non-linear schemes.
13 In co-operative game theory language, the licensing stage is essentially a generalized Nash-bargaining game with pro ts earned by the rms in absence of licensing i NL as the threat points. 
Licensing and Subsidy rates
The departure of our model from the standard Brander-Spencer framework lies in the the fact that any subsidy or tax, in addition to shifting pro ts also a ects the decision and payments regarding licensing. This section focuses on the relationship between subsidy and tranactions regarding technology licensing.
Given the cost parameters c h and c l and subsidy rates s h ; s l the surplusD from technology licensing can be written as Licensing Decision: Though Proposition 1 describes the e ect of subsidy on surplus from licensing, it does not address how the licensing decision is a ected by the subsidy. The following proposition summarizes the relationship between the licensing decision and the subsidy rates. A standard result in the licensing literature is that, when payment s c heme is xed fee, technology is not licensed if di erences in costs are too large. With large cost-di erences, the low-cost rm enjoys an`almost-monopoly' position and hence lacks the incentive to share its technology with its rival rm. For any given s l , an increase in s h reduces the cost-di erence. Proposition 2i states that by providing a suitably high s h and thereby suitably reducing cost di erence the high-cost country's government can ensure licensing. The opposite is true for the low-cost country's government.
Quality of the licensed technology: Throughout we h a v e assumed that, if technology is licensed, rm l transfers its low-cost technology c l to rm h. Assuming that the rms can produce at any marginal cost higher than the one it starts with, a natural question to ask is what prevents rm l to license an inferior technology -i. This section considers the cases where one of the country's government provides subsidy strategically to its own rm to maximize w elfare while the other country's government remains passive. Without loss of generality, w e assume that the passive g o v ernment sets subsidy to zero. The discussion below c haracterizes the optimal unilateral subsidies and compares it with the unilateral Brander-Spencer subsidy rates -the optimal subsidy rates in absence of possibility of licensing. Relationship between cost-di erences and the optimal subsidy is also explored.
The high-cost country
In this subsection, we consider optimal subsidy for government of the highcost country when the other government does not subsidize its national rm.
Let s denote speci c subsidy provided by the high-cost country's government. Note that the high-cost rm receives this subsidy for every unit of output it producesx h irrespective of whether it buys the technology from the low-cost rm or not.
Characterization
To facilitate the characterization of the optimal subsidy rates, we consider two h ypothetical regimes -1 a regime where licensing is compulsory -CLand 2a regime where licensing is banned -BL. Let W CL and W BL denote the welfare with compulsory licensing and banned licensing regime respectively. Incorporating the output decisions in Nash-equilibrium from the Cournot game, it follows from the de nition of welfare in 7 that For a given subsidy rate, welfare in compulsory licensing regime is welfare in absence of licensing plus the share of surplus it receives less the dis-savings in subsidy bill. We denote s BL = argmax s2 W BL , s CL = argmax s2 W CL s C = s h;C when s l = 0 and s O be the optimal subsidy with no government restrictions on licensing -the optimal subsidy rate in our framework. Note that s BL is the Brander-Spencer subsidy rates BS -the optimal subsidy in the absence of licensing. s C is the critical subsidy rate when the lowcost country's government has set subsidy to zero. Though the comparison between s BL and s CL require information on demand structure and -the share of surplus accrued to the licensee, we can claim the following From Lemma 1, it follows that the optimal subsidy in our framework will either be one of the optimal subsidy rates in the hypothetical regime and or if one of these rates violate the constraintsee Proposition 2i it is possible that critical subsidy rate will be optimal. Obviously, if both s CL and s BL violate the constraint -e.g.. if s CL s C s BL then the critical subsidy rate will be optimalat least in the limit. Can we s a y a n ything more about s O ? Proposition 4 provides a partial characterization s 0 based on comparisons between the three possible candidates -s BL ; s CL ; s C . Proof: See Appendix.
Characterization of the optimal subsidy in the proposition above is fairly 16 Strictly speaking s C in some case is the limit subsidy. Whether s C is optimal or optimal in the limit depends on what assumption we make regarding licensing decision when D = 0 .
intuitive. Consider 4i. Suppose the critical subsidy rate is higher than other two rates. Note that licensing takes place only if the subsidy rate is higher than s C . Given that s CL s C and assuming that the welfare expression is trictly concave in the subsidy rate maximum welfare with licensing occuring in equilibrium will be achieved at s C . H o w ever by de nition, at s C , the rms are indi erent b e t w een licensing and no-licensing and hence the surplus from licensing is zero. Welfare will be higher by providing a subsidy in nitesimally smaller than s C since there will be reduction in subsidy bill. Welfare will be even higher by providing a s BL since s BL is the optimal subsidy in absence of licensing. Similar intuition can be provided for 4ii and 4iii.
Comparison with Brander-Spencer subsidy:
Given the dependence of the value of s O on s C , a comparison between Brander-Spencer subsidy rates BS and s O might seem di cult. The following lemma states the condition under which comparison between unconstrained subsidy rates su ces. Given Lemma 2, a natural question to ask is, when is s CL s BL -i.e. when is the optimal subsidy under compulsory licensing regime lower than the optimal subsidy under the regime when licensing is banned? A general answer is when the rm h earns low share of the surplus. An increase in subsidy raises the surplus but it also raises dis-savings from the subsidy bill. Consider the extreme case where = 0 -the high cost rm does not earn any share of the surplus. The high-cost country's government does not have any incentive to raise the subsidy because marginal bene t of subsidy does not change from the no-licensing situation. The marginal cost is higher in terms of larger subsidy bill due to higher output produced by the high-cost rm following licensing. This points towards lower subsidies.
In our discussion so far we h a v e not assumed any particular demand structure. All our results hold if welfare functions in the hypothetical regimes are strictly concave and reduced-form pro t functions satisfy the property mentioned in Proposition 1. However, at this stage it seems necessary to impose structure on demand to proceed further. The rest of the discussion in this subsection assumes the linear demand structure mentioned in 1. To illustrate the possibility of taxation we consider a special case -= 0 i.e. where high-cost rm do not earn any share of the surplus or alternatively the low-cost rm makes-it a take-it-or-leave-it o er.
In case of take-it-or-leave-it o er by the the low-cost rm the optimal subsidy rate for the high-cost country's government i s The optimal subsidy schedule is drawn in Figure 1 assuming a , c l = 1 . Though the result is illustrated with = 0, the possibility of export taxation is more general. In particular even with equal division of surplus there exist cost parameters for which the optimal policy is a tax. Proposition 6 states the condition on surplus-sharing where the optimal policy is a export tax. parameters for which optimal subsidy might be n e gative! -i.e. optimal policy might be a tax.
Proof: See Appendix.
Our work provides a novel reasoning for tax -licensing. This is di erent from the other rationale provided in the literature for export taxation -joint pro t maximization, price competition etc. The reasoning is simple. Consider the case where rm h do not earn any share of the surplus. With rm h rm not earning any share of the surplus there is no marginal bene t from licensing while the marginal cost is higher because of the higher subsidy bill corresponding to any subsidy rate. This reduces the incentive to subsidize and hence subsidy is lower. In fact, the optimal subsidy can become so low that it might actually become negative. So the optimal policy might b e a tax. Another way and possible the more meaningful wayof thinking about why the optimal policy might be a tax is as follows. Since with licensing, output produced by the rm h is higher the high-cost country's government has a incentive to set tax. On the other hand, an increase in subsidy raises the surplus. If rm h has weak bargaining power low then government's incentive to subsidize its national rm is reduced. It sets a tax ensuring that technology is licensed. This is as if when the national rm cannot grab much of the surplus, the government is grabbing some of the surplus in the form of increased tax revenue.
4.1.3 Relationship between cost-competitiveness and subsidy level:
In the context of linear demand and constant marginal cost framework Neary1994 has shown that the greater the cost-advantage or less cost-disadvantage of a rm the higher the subsidy it receives. Neary's argument is -the more cost competitive is the home rmin this section the high-cost rm at the margin, the greater is its comparative advantage in pro t shifting and hence greater the pay-o to subsidizing it."
This relationship is not generally true in our framework. Notice from Figure 1 , for 0:4 0:45, higher the cost-di erences higher is the subsidy which is due to the fact the critical subsidy rates C is increasing in costdi erences and for the range of cost-parameters mentioned critical subsidy rate is optimal. Neary's result is entirely reversed if we consider = 1 -the high-cost rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it o er. With = 1 , s O = s CL = a , c l a + 2 = 4. It follows straightway that optimal subsidy is increasing in degree of ine ciencymeasured by the di erences in marginal cost. The higher is the cost-di erential the higher the subsidy the high-cost rm receives. Using 7 with linear demand structure, we get @D @s = 10a , c l . The marginal increase in surplus due to an additional unit of subsidy increases with cost-di erences and greater the value of the greater is this e ect. From the perspective of surplus, the high-cost country's government has an incentive to increase subsidy the more disadvantageous is its home rm and with = 1, this incentive dominates the incentive t o l o w er subsidy due to the comparative-advantage in pro t-shifting argument. Though it is possible to nd values of such that Neary's result go through in our framework the relationship between cost-di erences and the optimal subsidy levels is non-monotone. Probably more striking than non-monotonicity i n our framework is the fact that ine cient rms of the high-cost country might be subsidized while relatively less ine cient rm might be taxed. 
The low-cost country
The framework and the timing of the events is the same as in the previous section. The only di erence is that the low-cost country's government c hooses subsidy to maximize welfare while the high-cost country's government d o e s not subsidize or tax its national rm.
Let s denote speci c subsidy provided by the high-cost country's government. Firm l receives this subsidy for every unit of output it producesx l irrespective of whether it sells its technology to the rm h or not. We will be brief in discussing the issues which are similar to the previous section. Proof: See Appendix.
Characterization
Consider 4*i. Suppose the critical subsidy rate is higher than other two rates. Note that licensing can only take place with subsidy rate lower than s C . Since s BL s C , surplus is non-negative and subsidy bill is lower compared to the no-licensing which implies welfare with s BL is higher with licensing. Given that s BL = argmaxW BL and s CL s C , highest welfare will be achieved at s CL . Similar intuition can be provided for 4*ii and 4*iii.
Comparison with Brander-Spencer subsidy
Suppose we nd, comparing the optimal subsidies in the two h ypothetical regimes, that s CL s BL -i.e. optimal subsidy with compulsory licensing is lower than the optimal subsidy when licensing is banned. Does this su ce to conclude that optimal subsidy in presence of licensing is lower than the Brander-Spencer subsidy rate -optimal subsidy in absence of licensing. Generally, s CL is lower than s BL -when the high-cost rm earns low share of the surplus. An increase in subsidy lowers the surplus but it also increases the savings from the subsidy bill. Any further characterization requires some information regarding demand structure. We assume the demand to be linear for the rest of this subsection. 
Relationship between cost-competitiveness and subsidy level
To focus on the relationship between cost-di erences and the subsidy level we consider a special case -= 0 i.e. where high-cost rm do not earn any share of the surplus or alternatively the low-cost rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it o er.
In case of take-it-or-leave-it o er by the the low-cost rm the optimal subsidy rate for the low-cost country's government i s The optimal subsidy schedule is drawn in Figure 2 assuming a , c l = 1 .
Though the possibility of taxation does not arise in the linear demand framework the relationship between the cost-di erences and the subsidy rate is worth mentioning. The discontinuity in the optimal subsidy schedule should not be too surprising once we recognize that the optimization problem for the governments is not a standard concave programming problem.
The positive relationship between cost-competitiveness and subsidy, a s pointed out by Neary1994 holds in our example when it is optimal for the government to o er a subsidy level such that technology licensing does not take place0:24 0 : 33. For such cases, optimal subsidy is a,c l 1+ 4 , which clearly is increasing in cost-competitiveness . However, if licensing transfer takes place at the optimal subsidy level 0 : 24, then in contrast to Neary1994, optimal subsidy is decreasing in cost-competitiveness of the low-cost rm. To understand this, let us assume that the low-cost rm sells its technology for free. Then, optimal subsidy would be a,c l 4 . F or a given c l , relationship between subsidy level and cost-competitiveness will depend on the e ect of subsidy level on the license fee. License fee, L is given by L = 4c h , c l a , c h , s 9 20
Note that the license fee is decreasing in the subsidy level and the rate of decrease is increasing in cost-competitiveness of the low-cost rm. Hence, for a given c l , optimal subsidy is decreasing in the cost-competitiveness of the low-cost rm when technology transfer takes place. The discussion above can be summarized in the following proposition . Since optimal policy requires a lot of information which might be costly to obtain it is imperative t o l o o k a t w elfare gains from pursuing the optimal policy compared to a regime with Brander-Spencer subsidysince that's optimal in absence of technology licensing. Welfare gains are large for the intermediate values of cost-di erences. This is easy to understand once we recognize that for extreme values of cost di erences either Brander-Spencer subsidy is optimal, when the cost-di erences are extremely large and licensing does not take placeor optimal subsidy rate is close to the value of Brander-Spencer subsidy, when the cost di erences are extremely small. With small costdi erences,the e ect of a subsidy on surplus and the subsidy-bill are small as well and hence the optimal subsidy is not too di erent from the BranderSpencer subsidy. F rom Table 1 -which describes the case with = 0 -i t i s interesting to note that in some cases free trade actually yields higher welfare than the Brander-Spencer regime. The intuition is simple. From Figure 1 , it follows that for certain values of cost-di erences the optimal policy is a tax. So a free trade, or in other words a regime with zero subsidy is closer to optimum than one with a positive oneBrander-Spencer regime.
The low-cost country
Unlike high-cost country, w elfare gains from pursuing the optimal policy are not signi cant for low-cost country compared to Brander-Spencer regime. Table 2 displays the welfare gains from pursuing optimal policy with = 0. Once again the welfare gains are higher for intermediate values of cost di erences and the reasoning is same as in the previous subsection..
Banning licensing
In our discussion so far we h a v e implicitly assumed that government of the intervening country does not decide whether to allow licensing or not. It chooses a subsidy rate after which rms make decision regarding licensing. Let us consider a stage prior to the subsidy-setting stage where the government can allowbut not force or ban licensing. Is it possible for a country's government to ban licensing? The question is trivial when there are no Pigouvian interventions subsidy, taxes etc. and there is only one rm in each country. No rm will settle for a fee that lowers total rents and hence with any given bargaining power government i n tervention regarding licensing cannot improve w elfare. However in presence of export subsidies taxes licensing might be banned.
Proposition 8: Under Cournot competition, low-cost country's government will never ban technology licensing while high-cost country might ban licensing.
Proof: See appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 8 is as follows. For the low-cost country, allowing for licensing, two things can possibly happen -a licensing occurs if a Brander-Spencer subsidy is given blicensing does not occur with BranderSpencer subsidy rate. If b is true, then allowing licensing cannot be worse than banning it -the low-cost country's government can always allow licensing and provide Brander-Spencer subsidy rate. On the other hand if a is true note even if the low-cost rm does not receive a n y surplus welfare is higher. It follows from the observation that with corresponding to any subsidy rate,and hence corresponding to Brander-Spencer subsidy rate as well, rents are at least as high as with no-licensing and subsidy bill is lower.
High-cost country's government, while intervening unilaterally might nd it optimal to ban licensing. Consider Figure 1 with = 0 and = 0 : 1. s O = 0 : 05. Here,licensing occurs in equilibrium. However, if licensing is banned, rents received by the high-cost rm is unchanged compared to the situation where licensing is allowed while the subsidy bill is lower with s O .
This explains why high-cost country's government might w ant to ban licensing.
Policymaking by both the governments
In Brander-Spencer framework, policy-making by both governments is a simple extension of unilateral policy-making case because each countries' pro ts are a ected the same way b y an increase in subsidy -given other country's subsidy, a subsidy by a home country's government shifts pro ts towards its national rm. However, as we h a v e mentioned before, the surplus from licensing is a ected di erently to an increase in subsidy depending on whether the subsidy is provided by the high-cost country's government or the low-cost country's government. This increases the di culty of the problem and hence here 17 we focus on linear demand and focus on the whether the results and the intuition obtained in the previous section -where we discuss the unilateral policy-making case -goes through when both governments simultaneously choose subsidies.
We denote the subsidy rates associated with high-cost country and the low-cost country as s h and s l respectively. W e use s i BL and s i CL to denote optimal subsidy rates for country i, i 2 f l;hg when the licensing is bannedBL and when the licensing is compulsoryCL. Once again note that s h BL and s l BL are the Brander-Spencer subsidy rates. As in the previous sections, we also nd here -iunless the high-cost rm earns more than half of the surplus generated from licensing actually close to 60 subsidy under the compulsory licensing regime should be lower than the subsidy under banned licensing regime,ii there exists value of and range of cost parameters such that athe optimal policy for the high-cost country's government is a tax and blicensing might be banned by one of the country's government if the governments can choose to allow or ban licensing prior to setting subsidies. A complete characterization of optimal policies will be incorporated in the future versions of the paper. 17 The future versions of the paper will incorporate a detailed analysis of this problem 6 Price competition A standard criticism against oligopoly models of trade is that the results are sensitive, among other things, to the mode of product market-competition -whether the rms compete in quantities or prices 18 . So it is important t o c heck the robustness of our results with respect to price competition. Rather than focusing on the details 19 we show the e ects shown in Cournot also exist in Bertrand competition with di erentiated products. In particular, an increase in subsidy by the high-costlow-cost country's government increaseslowers the surplus while it raises the dis-savingssavings in subsidy bill.
In Bertrand competition with homogeneous product, there is no incentive to license since in the absence of commitment, product-market pro ts after licensing will be zero. So a minimal model of product di erentiation with two varieties is introduced where each of the varieties is produced by t w o separate rms as before one rm is high-cost and and the other one is low-cost. Let the inverse demand curve for variety ii; j 2 f l;hg b e
where measures the degree of product di erentiation and 2 0; 1.
Denoting s h and s l as the subsidy given by the high-cost country and the low-cost country's government respectively, it follows after some algebra that There is a small body of literature which endogenizes the mode of competition and tries to pin down the policies which are welfare improving irrespective of the market structure. Maggi1996 discusses trade policy with endogenous mode of competitioncaptured by a capacity-constraint parameter. He nds that capacity subsidies are generally welfare improving irrespective of the nature of competition. Bagwell and Staiger1994 have obtained similar result for investment subsidies. 19 In future versions of the paper, we plan to characterize optimal policies with price competition As in Cournot, high-cost rm's output is higher with licensingc = c l while the low-cost rm's output is lower.
Corresponding to any given subsidy rate, the subsidy bill in the high-cost country is higher by s 2, 2 c h ,c l 4, 2 1, 2 in the presence of licensing. This reduces the incentive to increase subsidy 20 . The low-cost country's subsidy bill is lower following licensing. Savings in the subsidy bill is s c h ,c l 4, 2 1, 2 . An increase in s increases the savings in subsidy bill -which provides incentive to the low-cost country's government to increase subsidy. The relationship between the surplus and the subsidy can be traced to Proposition 1. Notice that Proposition 1 states a condition on the reduced -form pro t function and not on the product market competition per se. It is easy to check that the joint-pro ts in this model satisfy those conditions. 20 In case of a tax this enhances the incentive to raise taxes.
A precise characterization requires comparison of the di erent subsidy rates note that with price-competition optimal subsidy is negative will be incorporated in future versions of this paper. However there is a interesting di erence between Bertrand and Cournot-competition in terms of welfare consequences assuming unilateral subsidy-setting. The di erence is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 9: Under Bertrand competition with di erentiated p r o ducts, high-cost country's government will never ban technology licensing low highcost country might ban licensing.
Proof: See appendix
In the absence of licensing, optimal subsidy for the high-cost country's government is negative -therefore the optimal policy is a export tax. We refer to it as the Eaton-Grossman 21 subsidys EG . Allowing for licensing welfare with s EG is strictly higher if licensing occurs with s EG . Consider the worst case from the high-cost country's viewpoint -= 0 . E v en then since s EG 0 the welfare is higher due to higher tax revenue. An example for the other case -why the low-cost country might ban licensing is provided in the Appendix.
Conclusion
In this paper, we c haracterize strategic trade policy in the standard thirdcountry model when technology licensing is possible. There are two sources of rents in our framework -product-market pro ts and surplus generated from licensing. Though the pro ts for the licensor and the licensee is a ected in the same way b y an increase in subsidy the surplus generated from licensing responds di erently to subsidy given by di erent g o v ernments. In particular, an increase in subsidy by the high-cost country's government increases the surplus while an increase in subsidy by the low-cost country's government lowers the surplus. Despite the di erences in e ects we nd that for a wide range of values for surplus-sharing parameter the optimal subsidy rate chosen by both the governments is lower. In fact, in certain cases we nd the optimal policy to be a tax. This is in contrast to the standard third-country model with two rms and quantity competition where the optimal policy is always a subsidy.
In our framework we also nd that unlike Neary1994, there is no simple monotone relationship between the subsidy a rm receives and its e ciency level. Non-monotonicity is borne out most strikingly with unilateral subsidysetting by the high-cost country's government. We nd that e cient rms might be taxed while relatively less e cient rms might be subsidized -i.e. governments doesdo not necessarily pick winners.
Finally, w e nd that the additional e ects of a subsidy in our framework are qualitatively similar in Bertrand and Cournot competition -a feature somewhat unusual in the oligopolistic models. However, there is an important di erence between these two modes of competition where we consider that the governments could allow or ban licensing. Assuming unilateral subsidysetting we h a v e shown that the licensor's country would never ban licensing under Cournot-competition but it might do so under Bertrand competition with the reverse being true for the licensee's country.
We h a v e focussed our discussion on duopoly competition in a thirdcountry market in order to deviate as less as possible from the original Brander-Spencer1985 framework. Exploring our result with an arbitrary number of rms is particularly important since when technology licensing is infeasible, the number of rms is a crucial factor in determining the sign and magnitude of policy. In our framework with an arbitrary number of rms is that we need to specify the bargaining mechanisms and the conclusions will depend on the assumptions made 22 . W e h a v e also abstracted from home 22 A natural assumption in any trading environment is that if there is one seller and many buyers, then the seller grabs the entire surplus. We conjecture that our results will go through in this case because in duopoly our results hold when the high-cost rm earn low share of the surplus. The result might not hold with several sellers and one buyer. If there are several low-cost rms all belonging to the same country and a low-cost rm belonging to a di erent country then the government of the high-cost country will nd it optimal to subsidize at a higher rate compared to when technology transfer is infeasible since the surplus is grabbed by the national rm. The government of the low-cost rm would want to subsidize more so that technology transfer does not take place because if licensing occurs the rms will undercut each other in terms of fee. However, if licensing does not occur then government might end up choosing Brander-Spencer subsidy. I t i s not clear whether subsidy chosen by g o v ernment of the low-cost rms will be lower or higher. With several high-cost as well as low-cost rms, the problems are compounded and it remains an area for further investigation.
consumption by focussing on third-country market. In presence of home consumption, in addition to the e ects mentioned in the paper, we also need to consider the e ect of a subsidy on consumer surplus. Moreover we need to include other instruments once we add home consumption. Examining the robustness of results with respect to these two important features is part of our current research 23 . 
Proof of Proposition 9
Suppose the high-cost country's government gives s EG . If s EG s C then clearly the high-cost country can always choose s O = s EG and licensing will not take place and welfare obtained in the absence of licensing can be guaranteed. If s EG s C , then even with = 0 -i.e rm h does not earn any share of the surplus -Ws EG ; d= 1 W s EG ; d= 0 due to higher tax revenue with d = 1 . The result follows from noting that Ws O Ws EG ; d= 1 and Ws EG ; d= 0 is the optimal subsidy in the absence of possibility of licensing.
Since we h a v e not spelled out the details of the price-competition framework in our paper, we just mention here why l o w-cost country's government might w ant to ban licensing. Suppose = 1 -i.e. rm l does not earn any share of the surplus and s EG 0. Then banning licensing will increase welfare due to increase in tax revenue and there are cases where Ws EG ; d= 0 W s O though if s EG is given without any restriction technology will not be licensed. Notes: G F T represent percentage gain in welfare from pursuing optimal policy compared to free trade while G BS represents percentage gain with respect to welfare at Brander-Spencer subsidy level.
